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Nullification of the Nullification
D.M.Appleby∗
Department of Physics, Queen Mary University of London, Mile End Rd, London E1 4NS, UK
A recent claim by Meyer, Kent and Clifton (MKC), that their models “nullify” the Kochen-
Specker theorem, has attracted much comment. In this paper we present a new counter-argument,
based on the fact that a classical measurement reveals, not simply a pre-existing value, but pre-
existing classical information. In the MKC models measurements do not generally reveal pre-existing
classical information. Consequently, the Kochen-Specker theorem is not nullified. We go on to prove
a generalized version of the Kochen-Specker theorem, applying to non-ideal quantum measurements.
The theorem was inspired by the work of Simon et al and Larsson (SBZL). However, there is a
loophole in SBZL’s argument, which means that their result is invalid (operational non-contextuality
is not inconsistent with the empirical predictions of quantum mechanics). Our treatment resolves
this difficulty. We conclude by discussing the question, whether the MKC models can reproduce the
empirical predictions of quantum mechanics.
I. INTRODUCTION
Prior to the work of Meyer [1], the Kochen-Specker theorem [2–6] (KS theorem) was generally regarded as one of
the key foundational results of quantum mechanics, establishing one of the most important ways in which quantum
mechanics enforces a radical departure from the assumptions of classical physics. Classically, a measurement is a
process which reveals the pre-existing value of the observable measured. Until recently it was generally accepted that
the KS theorem shows that quantum mechanics cannot be interpreted in such a way as to preserve this feature of
classical physics.
Unfortunately, the KS theorem, as originally formulated, only applies to ideal, or von Neumann measurement
processes. In practice, strict ideality is seldom, and perhaps never actually attainable. It follows that the KS
theorem, in its original form, is not sufficient to demonstrate a contradiction between classical assumptions and the
empirically verifiable predictions of quantum mechanics, regarding the outcome of real, laboratory measurements.
At first sight, this may not seem a serious problem. The natural assumption would be that the original KS theorem
is a limiting case of a more general theorem, which does apply to non-ideal measurements. We will eventually argue
that this is, in fact, the correct assumption. However, the question is greatly complicated by the work of Meyer [1],
Kent [7] and Clifton and Kent [8] (MKC in the sequel), who have argued that “finite precision measurement nullifies
the Kochen-Specker theorem”.
MKC’s claimed “nullification” of the KS theorem has given rise to some controversy. It has been discussed by (in
chronological order) Cabello [12], Havlicek et al [13], Mermin [14], Appleby [15,16], Simon et al [17], Larsson [18],
Simon [19], Cabello [20] and Boyle and Schafir [21]. For further discussion of the problem of demonstrating an empirical
contradiction with the predictions of non-contextual hidden variables theories see Cabello and Garc´ia-Alcaine [22],
Basu et al [23], Cabello [24], Michler et al [25], Simon et al [26] and Cereceda [27]. Finally, it should be noted that
MKC’s argument was inspired by the previous work of Pitowsky [9], Hales and Straus [10] and Godsil and Zaks [11]
(we briefly comment on Pitowsky’s work in the conclusion).
The arguments in this paper are largely new. They go significantly beyond any that have previously been given.
We begin by nullifying MKC’s claimed nullification. That is, we show that MKC’s ingenious mathematical construc-
tions, though deeply interesting in their own right, do not invalidate the essential physical point of the KS theorem.
Having cleared the conceptual ground, we then go on to establish a generalized version of the KS theorem, which
does apply to non-ideal measurements. In order to make the treatment comprehensive we conclude by discussing a
number of related questions. In particular, we discuss a recent claim by Cabello [20], that the MKC models do not
reproduce the empirically verifiable predictions of quantum mechanics.
Our main criticism of MKC’s argument is contained in Sections II–IV.
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Section II contains some preliminary considerations. MKC assume that an experimenter can never precisely know
what has “actually” been measured. This assumption plays an important role in their argument because it enables
them to postulate that it is physically impossible to measure each of the observables in a KS-uncolourable set. We
show that the assumption depends on some misconceptions regarding non-ideal quantum measurements.
Section III contains the crux of the critical part of our argument. The physical point of the KS theorem is to
show that quantum measurements cannot generally be interpreted as measurements in the classical sense. A classical
measurement is not simply a process which reveals a pre-existing value. Rather, it is a process which reveals a pre-
existing piece of classical information, represented by a proposition of the form “observable A took value x”. For this
condition to be satisfied it is essential that the value x and observable A both be adequately specified. It appears to
MKC that their models nullify the KS theorem because, in their models, a measurement does always reveal the value of
something. However, it does not reveal the precise identity of that something. Since the MKC valuations are radically
discontinuous this means that measurements do not generally reveal any classical information. Consequently, they
cannot generally be regarded as measurements in the classical sense. It follows that the KS theorem is not nullified.
Section IV contains some supplementary considerations, which reinforce the conclusion reached in Section III.
The argument just outlined goes beyond the arguments given in our previous papers because it shows that MKC’s
claim, to have nullified the KS theorem, is simply false. In Appleby [15,16] we showed that the MKC models are
highly non-classical. In fact, we showed in ref. [16] that the MKC models exhibit a novel kind of contextuality, which
is even more strikingly at variance with classical assumptions than the usual kind of contextuality, featuring in the
KS theorem. Consequently, the argument in ref. [16] is, by itself, sufficient to refute MKC’s suggestion, that their
models provide a classical explanation of non-relativistic quantum mechanics. The argument in ref. [15], though less
clear-cut, lends additional support to this conclusion. However, neither argument directly bears on MKC’s claim,
to have nullified the KS theorem as such. Indeed, at the time we wrote these papers it appeared to us that MKC
actually had “nullified the KS theorem strictly so-called” (as we put it).
It is important to establish that finite precision does unequivocally not nullify the KS theorem because, in the
absence of such a demonstration, it is impossible to achieve an unobstructed understanding of contextuality, as it
applies in a real, laboratory setting. The question has immediate, practical relevance, in view of the current interest
in experimental investigations of contexuality [17–19,22–27].
Having cleared the conceptual ground in Sections II–IV we go on, in Section V, to formulate and prove a generalized
KS theorem, applying to non-ideal measurements. The argument in this section is inspired by the argument of Simon et
al [17,19] and Larsson [18] (SBZL in the sequel). However, there are some important differences. SBZL work with an
“operational” concept of contextuality. Their motive for introducing this concept is to circumvent MKC’s argument.
Clearly, the motive no longer applies, once it is established that MKC’s argument is invalid. We are consequently able
to formulate a generalized KS theorem in terms of the ordinary concept of contextuality. This has several advantages.
In the first place it means that the result we prove is a straightforward generalization of the ordinary KS theorem.
In the second place, there is a loophole in SBZL’s argument, which means that their result is actually incorrect. As
we show in Appendix C, by means of a counter-example, operational non-contextuality is not inconsistent with the
empirical predictions of quantum mechanics. The modified argument we give in Section V resolves this difficulty.
Lastly, the result we prove implies a significantly different conclusion, as to the conditions which must be satisfied in
order refute non-contextual theories experimentally.
Sections II–V contain the main part of our argument. In Sections VI–VIII we address a number of related questions.
In Section VI we briefly discuss the POVM arguments given by Kent [7] and Clifton and Kent [8].
In Section VII we give an improved version of the argument in Appleby [15]. In the first place we have improved the
argument so as to take account of the points made in Section II of this paper. In the second place, the version we give
now does not involve joint measurements of non-commuting observables. In the third place, we have strengthened
the argument, using ideas derived from the subsequent work of SBZL.
In Section VIII we discuss the question, whether there actually exists a complete theory of MKC type which is
empirically equivalent to quantum mechanics. In particular, we discuss a recent claim by Cabello [20], that theories of
this type make experimentally testable predictions which conflict with those of quantum mechanics. We argue that,
although Cabello makes some very pertinent points, the question remains open.
II. WHAT IS “ACTUALLY” MEASURED?
MKC’s argument partly depends on a misconception, regarding non-ideal quantum measurements. We begin our
critical discussion by clarifiying this point. The criticisms which follow are preliminary to our main critical argument,
contained in the next section.
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MKC postulate that there are many observables which it is physically impossible to measure. If an experimenter
attempts to measure an observable Aˆ in this forbidden set, then what is actually measured is a slightly different
observable Bˆ. The measurement reveals the pre-existing value of the observable Bˆ which is actually measured.
It can be seen from this that MKC tacitly assume:
Property 1 For a given finite precision measuring apparatus there is a single, uniquely defined observable,
which is the only observable that is “actually” measured.
Property 2 The nominal observable, which is recorded in the experimenter’s notebook as having been
measured, is typically not the observable which is “actually” measured.
We will show that these assumptions are unjustified.
Before proceeding further, let us clarify the meaning of the term “nominal observable”, as it appears in the above
statement. The term essentially corresponds to Simon et al ’s [17] “switch position”. However, unlike Simon et al we
are not appealing to the concept of an “operational observable” (i.e. the concept that different instruments define
different observables—see Appendix C). We are simply recognizing the fact that the complete record of a measurement
(quantum or classical) must include, not only a specification of the value obtained, but also a specification of the
observable measured. Suppose, for instance, that an experimenter makes 1,000 different measurements of 1,000
different observables. If the experimenter simply writes down a list of 1,000 numbers, without any indication as
to how those numbers were obtained, then the record will obviously be useless (this point, that the outcome of a
measurement [quantum or classical] is, not simply a value, but a determinate proposition, will play a central role in
the argument of the next section).
It should be stressed that, although we refer, for convenience, to the actions of a human experimenter, the same
point would apply if the measurements were performed by a completely arbitrary “information gathering and utilizing
system” [28]. If the system is to utilize the information it acquires then it must record, in its memory area, a
specification of the observables measured, as well as the values obtained.
The nominal observable need not be specified precisely. Rather than recording the information “observable Sˆz was
measured and value +1/2 obtained”, one might instead record the information “observable n · Sˆ was measured, for
n ∈ U , and value +1/2 obtained” (where U is some subset of the unit 2-sphere). In the following we will assume
that the nominal observable is specified precisely, because this is legitimate, and because it happens to be the usual
practice. However, the argument could easily be modified so as to allow for the possibility that the nominal observable
is only specified partially.
Let us now consider MKC’s assumption that, for each quantum measurement, there is one, and only one observable
which is “actually” measured. The fact that this assumption is unjustified becomes apparent when one takes into
view (as MKC do not) the detailed physical implementation of an abstract quantum measurement scheme.
z
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FIG. 1. Schematic illustration of the Stern-Gerlach arrangement. The surface irregularities of the pole pieces, and asym-
metries in the environment, mean that the field is not perfectly symmetric. There is no single direction which represents the
alignment of the field more truly than any other. It follows that there is no single spin component which is measured more
truly than any other.
Consider, for example, a non-ideal measurement of the spin component n · Sˆ using a Stern-Gerlach apparatus. The
vector n is determined by the axis of symmetry of the arrangement. MKC take it that, in such a case, although the axis
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is not precisely known to the experimenter, there does actually exist a single, sharply defined axis of symmetry; and
that there correspondingly exists a single, sharply defined spin component n · Sˆ which is the only spin component that
is actually measured. However, this is to overlook the fact that the magnetic field will not, in practice, be perfectly
symmetric (due to irregularities in the shape of the pole-pieces, asymmetries in the placement of surrounding objects,
etc.). As illustrated in Fig. 1 the numerous slight departures from perfect symmetry introduce some unavoidable
“fuzziness” into the concept “axis of symmetry of the field”. Under these conditions there is no single vector n which
represents the axis of symmetry more truly than any other. This being so, there are no obvious grounds for picking
out any single spin component as the only component which is “actually” measured.
A measurement [30] of n · Sˆ is a process which discriminates the eigenstates of n · Sˆ. Given an unknown eigenstate of
n ·Sˆ, an ideal measuring instrument will inform the experimenter, with certainty, which particular eigenstate it was. A
non-ideal measuring instrument will inform the experimenter, with high probability, which particular eigenstate it was.
This is the definition of a quantum measurement process [30]: if a process performs the function, of discriminating
the eigenstates of an operator, then it is a measurement of that operator, ideal or non-ideal as the case may be.
Of course, it is seldom, if ever the case that a real laboratory instrument is strictly ideal, and the Stern-Gerlach
arrangement is no exception to this rule. It is important, furthermore, to note that, not only does a Stern-Gerlach
arrangement fail to perform an ideal measurement of the nominal spin component, which is recorded in the experi-
menter’s notebook as having been measured; it fails to perform an ideal measurement of any other spin component
either (for a discussion of the unavoidable sources of non-ideality in Stern-Gerlach measurements see Busch et al [31]).
The arrangement may, however, be used to perform non-ideal measurements (which is the most that can reasonably
be demanded of a real, laboratory instrument).
We can characterize the degree of non-ideality in quantitative terms by considering the probability that the process
will fail to correctly identify a given eigenstate. Suppose that the arrangement is used to measure the component
n · Sˆ for a spin-1/2 particle. Let p+−(n) (respectively p−+(n)) be the probability that, when the system particle is
initially in the spin up (respectively spin-down) eigenstate of n · Sˆ the measurement outcome is −1/2 (respectively
+1/2). Then it may be said that, the smaller these probabilities are, the more nearly ideal [32] the measurement.
There is no vector n for which p+−(n) = p−+(n) = 0 (see Busch et al [31]). There are, however, vectors n for
which the failure probabilities p+−(n), p−+(n) are both small. If n satisfies this condition the arrangement can be
used to discriminate the eigenstates of n · Sˆ with a high degree of reliability. In other words, it can be used to perform
non-ideal measurements of n · Sˆ.
The failure probabilities p+−(n), p−+(n) vary continuously with n. This means that, if the probabilities are small
for one vector n, then they will also be small for every other vector which is close to n. It follows that, for a given
arrangement, there are infinitely many different spin components which are all non-ideally measured. Furthermore the
class of observables which are non-ideally measured includes the nominal observable (provided it is correctly recorded,
and provided the instrument does not malfunction).
We began our discussion of the Stern-Gerlach arrangement by noting that, in practice, the arrangement will not have
a sharply defined axis of symmetry. It can now be seen that, even if the symmetry were exact, MKC’s assumption,
that there is only one observable that is “actually” measured, would still not be justified. It is true that there might
(perhaps) then be a well-defined, natural sense in which the measurement of n · Sˆ was “most nearly ideal” when n
was parallel to the axis of symmetry. But it would not follow that a neighbouring component n′ · Sˆ, defined by a
vector n′ which was not exactly parallel to the axis of symmetry, was not “actually” measured at all.
A process does not have to be precisely optimal in order to count as a measurement. If the probabilities p+−(n)
and p−+(n) become slightly larger, then that simply means that the process does not discriminate eigenstates quite
so efficiently as before. It does not mean that the process thereby ceases to be a measurement.
The real photon detectors which have been constructed to date are imperfect, in that there is a non-zero probability
that the detector will fail to register the presence of a photon. This does not mean that a real photon detector does
not “actually” detect photons at all. Furthermore, a photon detector whose performance becomes slightly degraded,
so that it is no longer quite so efficient as before, does not, on that account, cease to be a photon detector.
In general, however, there is no unambiguous, non-arbitrary, physically well-motivated way to define the concept
“unique spin component for which the measurement is most nearly ideal”. For instance, minimizing the function
(1/2)
(
p+−(n) + p−+(n)
)
, and minimizing the function
(
(1/2)
(
p+−(n)
2 + p−+(n)
2
))1/2
leads to definitions of this
concept which are, in general, incompatible (quite apart from the fact that the minima may not be unique). In the
general case there are many spin components which all have an equally valid claim to the status “spin component for
which the measurement is most nearly ideal”.
Thus far we have been considering the case of the Stern-Gerlach apparatus. However, it is shown in Appendix A
that the above criticisms apply much more generally, to the case of any approximate von Neumann measurement
(i.e. any non-ideal measurement described by a unitary operator which is close to a unitary operator describing a von
Neumann measurement). This provides strong grounds for the assertion that Properties 1 and 2 assumed by MKC
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should be replaced by
Property 1′ For a given finite precision measuring apparatus there are infinitely many different observables
which are non-ideally measured.
Property 2′ The nominal observable is among the observables which are non-ideally measured (provided
the nominal observable is recorded correctly, and provided there is no malfunction in the
measuring apparatus).
It may be worth remarking that these statements are also valid classically. Consider, for example a classical
measurement of the velocity component vz of some macroscopic object, using the Doppler shift of the radiation it
emits. In order to perform this measurement it is necessary that the line running from source to detector should be
parallel to the z-axis. The fact that source and detector are both extended objects, which are not perfectly symmetric,
means that, in practice, this line is not even precisely defined, let alone precisely known. However, this does not imply
that vz may not be the component which is “actually” measured. Rather, it is to be regarded as one of the sources
of error in the measurement of vz. A classical measurement of a classical observable A is a process which reveals,
with a high degree of reliability, and to a high degree of accuracy, the pre-existing value of A. On this definition the
procedure described effects a non-ideal classical measurement of n · v for every n which is nearly (but perhaps not
precisely) parallel to the z-axis.
The effect of the argument in this section is to restore the natural assumption of most physicists, that the observable
which an experimenter records as having been non-ideally measured is also measured in fact (provided the experimenter
does not make a mistake, and provided there is no malfunction in the measuring apparatus).
Let us now consider the bearing which this has on MKC’s argument. Our criticisms do not invalidate MKC’s
postulate, that a measurement of Aˆ may reveal the value of some other, neighbouring observable Bˆ. They do,
however, show that MKC cannot justifiably claim that Bˆ is the only observable which is “actually” measured, and
that Aˆ is not really measured at all. MKC cannot even claim that Bˆ is the uniquely defined observable for which the
measurement is most nearly ideal. In general, the observable Bˆ has no preferred status. Properly understood, MKC’s
postulate comes to this: that the hidden dynamics somehow selects an essentially arbitrary observable Bˆ ≈ Aˆ, whose
value it then reveals.
The point is important because, once MKC’s proposal is formulated correctly, it becomes easier to see the fallacy
in their argument.
III. NULLIFICATION OF THE NULLIFICATION
This section contains the main part of our critical argument.
The KS theorem shows
Proposition 1 No hidden variables interpretation can have the property that, for every observable Aˆ, an ideal
measurement of Aˆ always reveals the pre-existing value of Aˆ.
MKC’s claim, when appropriately re-formulated, so as to remove any unjustified appeal to the concept of “the unique
observable which is actually measured”, is that this proposition is “nullified” by
Proposition 2 There do exist hidden variables interpretations with the property that, for every observable
Aˆ, a finite precision measurement of Aˆ always reveals the pre-existing value of some unknown
observable Bˆ in a small neighbourhood of Aˆ.
In considering this claim the first problem we face is that the term “nullified” is not part of the standard lexicon of
science and mathematics, and so its meaning is potentially ambiguous. Propositions 1 and 2 are logically consistent,
so there can be no question of the KS theorem actually being refuted. It is not immediately apparent what, exactly,
is meant by the claim that Proposition 2 “nullifies” Proposition 1, without contradicting it.
In this connection it should be noted that the reference to finite precision measurements, on which MKC themselves
place much emphasis, is actually irrelevant. MKC postulate that, for each non-ideal measuring apparatus, the hidden
dynamics somehow arbitrarily selects an observable Bˆ, close to the nominal observable, whose value the measurement
then reveals. One could, with equal justification, postulate that the same is true for each ideal measuring apparatus:
implying
Proposition 2′ There do exist hidden variables interpretations with the property that, for every observable Aˆ,
an ideal measurement of Aˆ always reveals the pre-existing value of some unknown observable
Bˆ in a small neighbourhood of Aˆ.
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If the KS theorem is nullified by Proposition 2, then it must, presumably, also be nullifed by Proposition 2′. It would
seem to follow that such nullification as there might be cannot be attributed specifically to the finite precision.
In the following we will take the claim to be that the MKC models invalidate what had previously been regarded
as the key physical implication of the KS theorem: namely, the implication that quantum measurements cannot
systematically be interpreted as measurements in the classical sense. In the MKC models a measurement does
not always reveal the value of the nominal observable. It does, however, always reveal the value of an observable
which is extremely close to the nominal observable. MKC assume that is enough to recover the classical concept of
measurement.
The question we now have to decide is whether MKC are correct to assume that a process which does not reveal the
pre-existing value of the nominal observable may still count as a measurement in the classical sense. We will argue
that they are not.
The crucial point to realize is that a classical measurement is not simply a process which reveals a pre-existing
value. Rather, it is a process which reveals a pre-existing piece of classical information, represented by a proposition
of the form “observable A took value x”. For this to be true it is essential that the observable A and the value x both
be adequately specified. A process which reveals the value of some completely unknown observable does not reveal
any classical information, and is not a classical measurement.
The following example may serve to illustrate this point. Suppose that an experimenter is given a sealed box,
containing 100 individually labelled rods. Suppose that, for each integer n = 1, . . . , 100 the box contains exactly one
rod of length n cm. Suppose that the experimenter, without looking inside the box, uses a random number generator
to select a particular integer 1 ≤ n0 ≤ 100. It could be said that this procedure reveals the length of one of the rods in
the box. However, it does not reveal the identity of that rod. Consequently, the process does not reveal any classical
information, and so it cannot be considered a classical measurement.
It may, at first sight, seem that these remarks do not apply to the situation envisaged by MKC since, in their
models, the observable Bˆ, whose value is revealed by the measurement, is not completely unknown. In fact, it is
assumed that Bˆ is extremely close to the nominal observable Aˆ: so there is a sense in which Bˆ is specified very
precisely. However, it is not specified precisely enough.
The point here is that the MKC valuations are radically discontinuous. If the valuation could be assumed continuous
in the vicinity of Aˆ, then a process which revealed the value of some neighbouring observable Bˆ could be regarded
as a measurement in the classical sense. However, there is in fact always a region on which the valuation is highly
discontinuous, and so this assumption would not generally be justified.
Consider, for example, the colourings of the unit 2-sphere S2 discussed by Meyer [1] (and described in more detail
by Havlicek et al [13]). These colourings have the property that, given any n ∈ S2, every neighbourhood of n contains
infinitely many points evaluating to 0, and infinitely many points evaluating to 1. Suppose, now, that one performs a
finite precision measurement of the nominal observable (n · Sˆ)2 and obtains (say) the value 1. Then one knows that,
there is a point n′ in some small neighbourhood U of n which evaluates to 1. However, U contains infinitely many
points evaluating to 1, and infinitely many points evaluating to 0. The process does not reveal any more information,
as to which particular point takes which particular value, than could be obtained by tossing a coin. Consequently,
it cannot be considered a classical measurement. It is not a classical measurement for the same reason that random
number generators cannot be used to make classical measurements of length.
Essentially the same criticism applies to an arbitrary model of MKC type. In the general case the highly discon-
tinuous behaviour just discussed may not occur everywhere, on the whole of S2. However, there will always be a
non-empty open subset of S2 on which such behaviour occurs.
The detailed proof of this statement is given in Appendix B. We will confine ourselves here to summarising the
main points.
Consider an arbitrary MKC colouring f :S20 → {0, 1}. Here S20 is any dense, KS-colourable subset of the unit
2-sphere S2 having the property that the set of triads contained in S20 is dense in the space of all triads (MKC assume
that S20 is also countable; however the argument which follows does not depend on this assumption).
We define the discontinuity region D ⊆ S2 to consist of those points n ∈ S2 with the property that each neigh-
bourhood of n contains infinitely many points evaluating to 0, and infinitely many points evaluating to 1 (it is not
assumed that n itself ∈ S20). We define the continuity region C ⊆ S2 to consist of those points n ∈ S2 with the
property that f is continuous on U ∩ S20 , for some neighbourhood U of n. In the case of the Meyer colourings C = ∅
and D = S2. However, this is not true generally.
It is readily verified that these regions partition S2 (the complete unit 2-sphere, not just S20) into two disjoint
subsets: C ∪D = S2 and C ∩D = ∅. It is also readily verified that C is open and D is closed.
The key result, proved in Appendix B, is that C is not only open, but also KS-colourable. Furthermore, the
KS-colouring f defined on C ∩ S20 uniquely extends to a continuous, induced KS-colouring f¯ :C → {0, 1}.
We show in Appendix B that this result places significant constraints on the minimum size of the discontinuity
region. In the first place,D must have non-empty interior (i.e. it must contain a non-empty open subset—implying that
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it cannot simply consist of a set of isolated points or lines). In the second place, there is a fixed, model-independent,
non-zero lower bound on the solid angle subtended by D.
Let us now consider the bearing of these results on MKC’s claim, to have “nullified” the KS-theorem. The argument
we gave above (in connection with the Meyer colourings) shows that the f -value assigned to a specific point ∈ D∩S20
cannot be ascertained by any quantum measurement and is, in this sense, inaccessible. On the other hand the f -value
assigned to a specific point ∈ C ∩S20 can be ascertained by a quantum measurement, and so it is accessible (provided
the observable whose value is revealed is sufficiently close to the nominal observable). It is easy to see that the same
is also true of the f¯ -value assigned to a specific point ∈ C (where f¯ is the induced KS-colouring defined above).
From an empirical point of view it is not the f -values defined on S0 which are significant, but the f¯ -values defined
on C. It is only when n ∈ C that a quantum measurement of (n · Sˆ)2 can be interpreted as a measurement in the
classical sense, which reveals the corresponding f¯ -value (provided the observable whose value is revealed is sufficiently
close to the nominal observable).
The fact that there exist non-empty, KS-colourable open subsets of S2 is trivial (consider, for example, the cone
C = {n ∈ S2: |nz| > 1/
√
2}). There is no sense in which this fact can validly be said to nullify the KS theorem.
In conclusion, it can be seen that the finely calculated approach of MKC, where one marks in individual points
using a pencil, gets no nearer to “nullifying” the KS theorem than does a cruder approach, where one paints in whole
open regions using a brush. It can also be seen that a would-be nullifier gets no nearer to his/her goal by postulating
that a measurement reveals the value of an observable which is typically not the nominal observable.
IV. NULLIFYING MADE EASY
This section contains some supplementary considerations. Its purpose is to reinforce the point made in the last
section that, for a model to nullify the KS theorem, rather more is required than the bare fact, that a measurement
always reveals the pre-existing value of something.
If the KS theorem could be nullified in the manner that MKC propose, then one could achieve that end more
straightforwardly, without appealing to MKC’s sophisticated set-theoretic constructions, by means of one of the
following, much less sophisticated models.
Since it is a hidden variables theory that is in question, Ockham’s razor does not apply, and so we are free to
multiply hypothetical entities at will. Let us accordingly postulate that, corresponding to each observable (n · Sˆ)2
of the conventional theory, there exist two beables sA(n) and sB(n). Each beable is assigned the value 0 or 1. We
postulate that these values fluctuate randomly, and independently, but in such a way that, for each n, at every time,
exactly one of the beables sA(n), sB(n) is assigned the value 0, and exactly one is assigned the value 1. In every other
respect the model coincides with conventional quantum mechanics. We are thus assuming that the values taken by
the beables have no causal influence on the outcome of a measurement—or, for that matter, on anything else. Their
function is simply to exist. We will refer to this as model 1.
It is trivially true that, in model 1, the effect of measuring (n · Sˆ)2 is to reveal the pre-existing value of one of
the two quantities sA(n) or sB(n). This is to be compared with the situation in the MKC models, where the effect
is to reveal the value of one out of an infinite set of vectors contained in some small neighbourhood of n. It would
consequently seem that, if one is to accept that the MKC models nullify the KS theorem, then one must accept that
model 1 nullifies it equally well.
Of course, it is intuitively evident that the KS theorem is not really nullified by model 1. However, it is worth
examining the reason for this.
Model 1 does not nullify the KS theorem because, even though the measurement reveals a pre-existing value, the
experimenter does not learn anything thereby. The experimenter already knows, before the measurement, just from
the way the model is defined, that exactly one of the two quantities sA(n) or sB(n) takes the value 0. The experimenter
does not know more after the measurement. The procedure cannot be used to acquire additional knowledge concerning
sA(n), sB(n) and so it is not, in the classical sense, a measurement of these quantities. In short, model 1 does not
nullify the KS theorem for essentially the same reason that the MKC models do not nullify it.
It is also illuminating to consider the following, slightly different model, which we will refer to as model 2. Model 2
is the same as model 1, except that the quantities sA(n), sB(n) are not assumed to fluctuate. Instead, it is postulated
that, for each n, sA(n) always takes the value 0, and sB(n) always takes the value 1.
In model 2 a measurement of (n · Sˆ)2 not only reveals the pre-existing value of sA(n) or sB(n): the experimenter
even knows which of the two quantities took this value. Nevertheless, there is still no nullification. Suppose that an
experimenter measures (n · Sˆ)2 and obtains the value 0. Then, on the assumptions of model 2, the experimenter knows
that sA(n) took the value 0. However, the experimenter knew this already, before carrying out the measurement.
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The procedure has not conveyed any additional information, regarding sA(n), and so it is not, in the classical sense,
a measurement of sA(n).
The triviality of the constructions makes it evident that models 1 and 2 do not really nullify the KS theorem.
However, the underlying fallacy is essentially the same as the fallacy underlying the much more sophisticated arguments
of MKC. The only difference is that, in the case of the MKC models, partly because the constructions are so much
more sophisticated, the fallacy is less obvious.
V. KS THEOREM FOR NON-IDEAL MEASUREMENTS
In Sections II–IV we established the negative result: that finite precision does not “nullify” the KS theorem. The
purpose of this section is to establish the positive result: that the KS theorem has a natural generalization, applying
to the non-ideal measurements which might actually be performed, in the laboratory.
The original version of the KS theorem shows
Proposition 1 No hidden variables interpretation can have the property that, for every observable Aˆ, an ideal
measurement of Aˆ always reveals the pre-existing value of Aˆ.
—meaning that ideal quantum measurements cannot systematically be interpreted as ideal classical measurements,
of the same observables.
The generalized version of the KS theorem shows
Proposition 1′ No hidden variables interpretation can have the property that, for every observable Aˆ, a near-
ideal measurement of Aˆ always has a high probability of revealing a good approximation to the
pre-existing value of Aˆ.
—meaning that near-ideal quantum measurements cannot systematically be interpreted as near-ideal classical mea-
surements, of the same observables.
Proposition 1′ is a qualitative statement, since the terms “near-ideal”, “high probability” and “good approximation”
are not sharply defined. In the following we will prove an inequality which gives unambiguous, quantitative expression
to Proposition 1′, as it applies to the standard example of a spin 1 system (see Inequality (3) below).
Proposition 1′ does not exclude the possibility that a near-ideal quantum measurement may reveal the pre-existing
value of something other than the nominal observable. As we saw in Sections III and IV this possibility has no bearing
on the essential point of the KS theorem, which is to show that there is a radical difference between the quantum
mechanical and classical concepts of measurement.
Proposition 1′ does not only exclude the possibility of interpreting quantum measurements as ideal classical mea-
surements. This is important, since there would otherwise be no conflict with classical assumptions. One does not
classically expect a real, laboratory measurement to be strictly ideal (in the classical sense).
The argument which follows was inspired by the work of Simon et al [17,19] and Larsson [18] (SBZL). However,
we do not use their “operational” definition of contextuality. This makes the relationship with the original KS
theorem much clearer. Furthermore, there is a loophole in SBZL’s argument, which means that the result stated by
them is actually invalid (operational non-contextuality is not inconsistent with the empirical predictions of quantum
mechanics). Lastly, the result we prove implies a significantly different conclusion, as to the conditions which must
be satisfied in order to refute non-contextual theories experimentally. For further discussion of SBZL’s approach see
the end of this section, and Appendix C.
Consider the standard case of a spin-1 system, with spin vector Sˆ. Consider an apparatus which can be used to
perform a joint, possibly non-ideal measurement of the observables (e1 · Sˆ)2, (e2 · Sˆ)2, (e3 · Sˆ)2 for any orthonormal
triad τ = {e1, e2, e3}.
We are here assuming that it is physically possible to (non-ideally) measure every triad τ—contrary to what is
postulated by MKC. The justification for this assumption is that, if it is physically possible to (non-ideally) measure
one triad, then it follows from rotational invariance, together with the argument in Section II and Appendix A of
this paper, that it is physically possible to (non-ideally) measure every other triad. Suppose, for instance, that one is
given an apparatus which (non-ideally) measures the triad τ , and one wants to measure the triad τ ′ which is obtained
by rotating τ through the Euler angles θ, φ, ψ. Then one simply rotates the apparatus through these angles. The fact
that the rotation cannot be performed with infinite precision does not mean that the apparatus may not measure τ ′
at all. It only means that the measurement of τ ′ may be less nearly ideal than would otherwise be the case (i.e. it
may discriminate the eigenstates of τ ′ less reliably than would otherwise be the case). For further discussion of the
practical realization of such measurements see Swift and Wright [33].
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Let pq(τ, ψ) be the probability that a measurement of τ results in one of the “illegal” combinations
000, 001, 010, 100, 111, given that the system was prepared in the state ψ. Define
ǫq = sup
τ,ψ
(
pq(τ, ψ)
)
(1)
The quantity ǫq partially characterizes the degree of non-ideality of the quantum measuring device (the characteriza-
tion is only partial because the condition ǫq = 0, though necessary, is not sufficient for strict ideality). It corresponds
to SBZL’s quantity ǫ (mutatis mutandi).
Let fλ(n) be the pre-existing value of (n · Sˆ)2 when the hidden state is λ (it should be stressed that fλ is defined
for every n, and so it is not a KS-colouring). Let pc(τ, λ) be the probability that, with the system initially in the
hidden state λ, a measurement of τ fails to reveal the fλ-values of τ . Define
ǫc = sup
τ,λ
(
pc(τ, λ)
)
(2)
The quantity ǫc characterizes the degree of non-ideality of the apparatus regarded as a classical measuring device,
whose function is to reveal pre-existing values. It should be noted that ǫc depends on the particular hidden variables
theory considered. Unlike ǫq it has no empirical significance.
We will now prove
Nǫq + ǫc ≥ 1 (3)
where N is the smallest number of triads which do not admit a consistent colouring.
This inequality shows that ǫq and ǫc cannot both be made arbitrarily small. It thus gives precise, quantitative
expression to the qualitative statement of Proposition 1′.
Proposition 1′ is a general statement, so it allows for the possibility that a measurement may reveal a good
approximation to the pre-existing value, without revealing it exactly. In the case considered here there are only two
possible values, and so this contingency cannot arise.
To prove this inequality, consider the probability pi(τ, λ) that, when the hidden state is λ, a measurement of τ gives
one of the “illegal” results 000, 001, 010, 100, 111. We have, for all ψ,
pq(τ, ψ) =
∫
Λ
pi(τ, λ) dνψ (4)
where Λ is the hidden state space (of the system by itself), and νψ is the probability measure on Λ which corresponds
to the quantum state ψ.
Now choose a KS-uncolourable set which contains the smallest possible number of distinct orthornormal triads.
Let τ1, . . . , τN be an enumeration of these triads. By construction there exists, for each λ, an index rλ such that the
fλ-values of τrλ are “illegal”. It is then a straightforward consequence of the definitions that
1− pi(τrλ , λ) ≤ pc(τrλ , λ) (5)
implying
pi(τrλ , λ) ≥ 1− ǫc (6)
for all λ. Taking this result in conjunction with Eqs. (1) and (4) we deduce
Nǫq ≥
N∑
r=1
pq(τr, ψ) =
∫ ( N∑
r=1
pi(τr, λ)
)
dνψλ ≥
∫
pi(τrλ , λ) dν
ψ
λ ≥ 1− ǫc (7)
—which is the result claimed.
It is worth remarking that this argument actually establishes the stronger, state-dependent inequality
Nǫq(ψ) + ǫc ≥ 1 (8)
where ǫq(ψ) = supτ
(
pq(τ, ψ)
)
.
If the measurement faithfully reveals pre-existing values then Inequality (3) implies Nǫq ≥ 1. This is similar to the
result claimed by SBZL [17–19], that Nǫq ≥ 1 in any theory which is operationally non-contextual (substituting our
ǫq for their ǫ). However, it is not the same because a theory which does not faithfully reveal pre-existing values may
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still be non-contextual in the sense of SBZL’s operational definition. SBZL’s claim is actually incorrect, since there
exist operationally non-contextual theories with the property that Nǫq = 0 (see Appendix C).
Simon et al ’s [17] statement, that there is a conflict with classical assumptions as soon as ǫq < 1/N , also requires
modification. Suppose that ǫq is only slightly less than < 1/N . Then it is true that the classical failure probability
cannot be strictly zero. However, it may still be very small—which would be entirely consistent with classical
assumptions regarding a real laboratory instrument. Indeed, the possibility is not excluded that 0 < ǫc ≪ ǫq < 1/N—
implying that the apparatus actually functions much better when regarded from the classical point of view, as an
instrument for revealing pre-existing values, than it does when regarded from the quantum point of view, as an
instrument for discriminating eigenstates. It follows that, in order to demonstrate an experimental conflict with the
classical concept of measurement, it is not enough simply to construct an apparatus for which ǫq < 1/N . Instead, one
must reduce ǫq to the point where the lower bound on ǫc becomes ∼ 1.
The purpose of this section was to establish the basic point of principle, that the KS theorem does have a valid
generalization applying to non-ideal measurements. For this purpose it was sufficient to confine ourselves to the single
example of a spin 1 system. However, it would clearly be interesting to examine other examples. Indeed, we have
not shown that Inequality (3) is the only, or even the most useful inequality applying a spin 1 system. One would
expect there to be many different ways to give quantitative expression to the qualitative principle represented by
Proposition 1′. This is a question which requires further investigation.
VI. KENT AND CLIFTON’S POVM ARGUMENT
In this section we briefly consider the argument of Kent [7] and Clifton and Kent [8] to (as they put it) “rule out
falsifications of non-contextual models based on generalized observables represented by POV measures”. We include
this section for the sake of completeness. A reader who is so inclined may skip to the next section without loss of
continuity.
A POVM (or positive operator valued measure [31,34–36]) is an indexed set of positive operators Fˆi with the
property
∑
i Fˆi = 1 (following Kent and Clifton we take the set to be finite). Kent and Clifton take the view that to
each distinct POVM there corresponds a distinct generalized observable. A generalized observable, in effect, simply
is a POVM.
Kent and Clifton consider that a non-contextual theory of generalized observables would be one in which generalized
measurements reveal the pre-existing truth values of the corresponding POVMs. Their argument to show that such
theories exist is similar to the argument which, they claim, nullifies the ordinary KS theorem. The objection to it is
also similar.
Let A be the set of all positive operators. Kent and Clifton postulate that the POVM which is actually measured
is always contained in a certain dense subset Ad ⊂ A, which is colourable in a generalized sense. If Fˆi is the POVM
that is actually measured, then the outcome will be the unique index i0 for which Fˆi0 evaluates to “true”.
The objection to this argument is essentially the point we have already made, in Sections III and IV. The problem is
that the experimenter does not know the identity of the positive operator whose truth value is revealed. Suppose that
an experimenter measures the nominal POVM Fˆi, and obtains the result i0. Then s/he knows that there is another,
typically different POVM Fˆ ′i for which Fˆ
′
i0 is “true”. The experimenter knows that something is “true”. However,
the experimenter does not know what that something is. Consequently, the procedure is not genuinely informative.
If one is told “proposition p is true”, but is not given any indication what the symbol p denotes, then one has not
really been told anything.
Kent and Clifton consider that their POVM argument includes, as a special case, an alternative proof that non-ideal
measurements of conventional observables can be explained non-contextually [37]. Let us consider how this might
work.
POVMs play an important role in the mathematical description of non-ideal measurements of conventional observ-
ables. Consider, for example, the non-ideal measurement of the conventional observable Aˆ =
∑
a a|a〉〈a| described by
Eq. (A2) in Appendix A. Define
Eˆa = |a〉〈a|+
∑
b
ǫb,aa|a〉〈b|+
∑
b
ǫ∗b,aa|b〉〈a|+
∑
b1,b2,c
ǫ∗b1,caǫb2,ca|b1〉〈b2| (9)
It is readily verified that the operators Eˆa constitute a POVM. Their physical significance is that, if the system is
initially in the state |ψ〉, then 〈ψ|Eˆa|ψ〉 is the probability that the result of the measurement will be a.
Let us note, parenthetically, that it may be questioned whether the concept of a generalized observable is appropriate
in the case of POVMs which arise in this way, as part of the mathematical description of non-ideal measurements of
conventional observables [15,39].
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Clifton and Kent consider that, in the case of the measurement process described by Eq. (A2), what is actually
measured is, not really Aˆ at all, but rather the POVM Eˆa. Of course, the unitary operator Uˆ in Eq. (A2), and the
POVM Eˆa defined in terms of it, could not, in practice, be known, with infinite precision. Consequently, Clifton and
Kent’s POVM argument, when specialized to non-ideal measurements of conventional observables, establishes the
following: there exist models in which the effect of non-ideally measuring an observable Aˆ =
∑
a a|a〉〈a| is to reveal
the pre-existing truth values of some unknown POVM Eˆa ≈ |a〉〈a|. Conceived as a way of nullifying the KS theorem
this result is no more effectual than Proposition 2, which we criticized in Sections III and IV.
VII. CONTEXTUALITY OF SEQUENTIAL ANALYZERS
In this section we discuss the predictions of the MKC models regarding sequential measurements, using three
separate analyzers. If the arrangement is near-ideal, then the observable whose value is revealed by one analyzer
must depend on the settings of the other two analyzers. In other words, it must depend on the overall experimental
context.
This result serves to reinforce the conclusion reached earlier, that the MKC models are highly non-classical. It
also raises the question, whether the MKC models are capable of reproducing the empirical predictions of quantum
mechanics—as discussed in the next section.
The argument which follows is an improved version of an argument given in Appleby [15]. In the first place we have
improved the argument so as to take account of the points made in Section II of this paper. In the second place, the
version we give now does not involve joint measurements of non-commuting observables. In the third place, we have
strengthened the argument, using ideas derived from the subsequent work of SBZL.
(e1.S^)2 (e2.S^)2 (e3.S^)2
FIG. 2. Sequential measurement of (e1 · Sˆ)
2, (e2 · Sˆ)
2, (e3 · Sˆ)
2. The system passes through a succession of analyzers, which
measure each observable in turn.
Consider sequential measurements of the observables (e1 · Sˆ)2, (e2 · Sˆ)2, (e3 · Sˆ)2, using the apparatus illustrated in
Fig. 2. The apparatus consists of three identical, non-ideal analyzers chained together. Sˆ denotes the spin vector of
a spin 1 system, and {e1, e2, e3} is an arbitrary orthonormal triad. The assumption that {e1, e2, e3} can be chosen
arbitrarily is justified in Section V.
The fact that there may be errors in the alignment of the analyzers is already included in the fact that the analyzers
are not assumed ideal (see Section II). It may therefore be assumed that the nominal triad {e1, e2, e3} is strictly
orthogonal.
Suppose that one of these analyzers is used on its own, to measure the single observable
(
n · Sˆ)2. MKC postulate
that the measurement will reveal the value of some neighbouring vector n′ ∈ S20 (where, as usual, S20 denotes the
dense, KS-colourable set on which the MKC valuations are defined). For each n there is a probability measure µn
such that µn(A) is the probability that n
′ ∈ A ⊆ S20 .
Now consider the situation when the analyzers are used jointly, to measure (e1 ·Sˆ)2, (e2 ·Sˆ)2, (e3 ·Sˆ)2. Let (e′1, e′2, e′3)
be the triad whose values are revealed by the measurement. If the behaviour of each analyzer is independent of the
context in which it is used, then the probability that (e′1, e
′
2, e
′
3) ∈ A1 ×A2 ×A3 must be µe1(A1)µe2(A2)µe3(A3).
It can be seen that, if the behaviour of the analyzers is context-independent, then the triad {e′1, e′2, e′3} is not
guaranteed to be strictly orthogonal (unlike the triad {e1, e2, e3}, which is orthogonal by assumption). Consequently,
the measurement outcome is not guaranteed to be one of the “legal” combinations 110, 101, 011. In Appendix D we
use this to show that, if the analyzers are sufficiently near-ideal, then the assumption of context-independence conflicts
with the empirical predictions of quantum mechanics. Specifically, we show that context-independence implies
Nǫq ≥ 1
2
(10)
where ǫq is the quantum non-ideality index defined by Eq. (1), and N is the smallest number of distinct orthonormal
triads which cannot be consistently coloured.
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Inequality (10) shows that, if the analyzers are sufficiently near-ideal, so that ǫq < 1/(2N), then the observable
whose value is revealed by one analyzer must depend on the settings of the other two analyzers. This is a form of
contextuality.
Inequality (10) was derived on the assumption that a measurement of
(
n · Sˆ)2 always reveals the pre-existing value
of n′ ∈ S20 . Suppose we make the weaker assumption, that the value of n′ is only revealed with probability ≥ 1− δc.
Then a similar argument to that given in Appendix D shows
Nǫq + δc ≥ 1
2
(11)
if the behaviour of the analyzers is context-independent. This inequality should be compared with Inequality (3).
It should be noted that essentially the same argument goes through in the case where the measurements are made
non-sequentially. We have chosen to focus on the sequential case because that is where the conflict with classical
assumptions emerges most clearly.
Kent [38] has argued that sequential measurements are not joint measurements. According to him a process does
not count as a joint measurement unless the different observables are measured “all at once”, in parallel so to speak.
We consider this objection to be unjustified, for the reasons explained in Appendix E.
VIII. ARE THE MKC MODELS EMPIRICALLY EQUIVALENT TO QUANTUM MECHANICS?
The purpose of this section is to discuss the question, whether there actually exists a complete theory of MKC type
which is empirically equivalent to quantum mechanics. In particular, we will discuss a recent claim by Cabello [20],
that theories of MKC type make empirically testable predictions which definitely conflict with those of quantum
mechanics. Our conclusion will be that, although Cabello makes some very pertinent points, the question remains
open.
To begin with it should be noted that, as Clifton and Kent [8] themselves emphasize, the MKC models are, as they
stand, incomplete, since they do not include any dynamical postulate. The result proved in the last section illustrates
this point. We showed that, if the analyzers in Fig. 2 are sufficiently near-ideal, MKC’s assumptions require there to
be a delicately adjusted “conspiracy”, whereby the behaviour of one analyzer is influenced by the settings of the other
two analzyers in just that particular manner which is required to secure agreement with the empirical predictions
of quantum mechanics. In a complete hidden variables theory this conspiracy would be explained in terms of the
dynamics of the hidden variables describing the system+apparatus+environment composite. However, MKC do not
consider the dynamics. Consequently, their account does not show that it is actually possible to construct a complete,
dynamical theory having all the required properties.
Let Pd be the set of projections on which the MKC valuations are defined, and let Λ be the hidden state space.
Clifton and Kent [8] show that one can associate to each Pˆ ∈ Pd a function P : Λ→ {0, 1}, and to each quantum state
ψ a probability measure νψ such that
〈ψ|Pˆ |ψ〉 =
∫
Λ
P (λ) dνψ (12)
Let us call this their statistical theorem.
In order to obtain a complete hidden variables theory, they would need to supplement this result with a dynamical
theorem. They would need to show that there exists a one-parameter family of mappings Ft: Λ → Λ such that
Ft1 ◦ Ft2 = Ft1+t2 and
νψt = νψ ◦ F−1t (13)
for all t, ψ (where ψt denotes the Schro¨dinger picture state into which ψ evolves after a time t). It is a non-trivial
question, whether such mappings actually exist.
There are three weaknesses in MKC’s argument. MKC’s mathematical results—the existence of dense KS-colourable
sets, and Clifton and Kent’s statistical theorem—are clearly formulated, and rigorously proved. However, the physical
part of their argument, to show that these results have the effect of “nullifying” the KS theorem, is much less clear,
as Cabello [12] and Mermin [14] have stressed. The counter-argument we presented in Sections II–IV was directed at
this point of weakness. We showed that the physical part of MKC’s argument disintegrates when subjected to careful
analysis.
The second point of weakness is the lack of any dynamical theorem. If it could be shown that it is definitely not
possible to define a dynamical evolution satisfying Eq. (13), then it would follow that there does not exist a complete
theory of MKC type which is empirically equivalent to quantum mechanics.
12
The third weakness is that MKC only consider joint measurements of commuting observables. In a genuinely non-
contextual theory there should be a principle of approximate non-contextuality, applying to joint measurements of
non-commuting observables [15].
The argument in Cabello [20], however, is not directed at any of these points of weakness. Instead, Cabello claims
to have derived a result (his Lemmas 3 and 4) which directly contradicts Clifton and Kent’s statistical theorem. There
are only two possibilities here: either there must be a technical mistake in the proof of Clifton and Kent’s statistical
theorem, or else there must be a technical mistake in the proof of Cabello’s Lemmas 3 and 4. It appears to us that
the mistake is in fact on Cabello’s side.
MKC postulate that the effect of measuring an observable Pˆ is to reveal the pre-existing value of some other
observable Pˆ ′ which is very close to Pˆ . Cabello (see footnote 27 in his paper) takes this to imply that a sufficiently
high precision measurement of Pˆ will, with high probability, reveal the pre-existing value of Pˆ itself (if Pˆ is in the set
Pd on which the valuation is defined). In other words he assumes (in the notation of Eq. (12) above) that, if Pˆ ′ ≈ Pˆ ,
then there is a high probability that P ′(λ) = P (λ). He fails to allow for the fact, which we proved in Section III
and Appendix B, that the MKC valuations are radically discontinuous. This means that a knowledge of the value of
Pˆ ′ does not, in general, convey any information at all regarding the value of Pˆ , no matter how small the difference
Pˆ ′ − Pˆ .
If Pˆ ′ ≈ Pˆ then it follows from Eq. (12) that ∫
Λ
(P ′(λ) − P (λ)) dνψ ≈ 0 for all ψ. However, this does not imply∫
Λ |P ′(λ)− P (λ)| dνψ ≈ 0, as assumed by Cabello.
Cabello’s argument can, in fact, be turned around, to disprove the assumption on which it depends. It follows from
Clifton and Kent’s statistical theorem that the conclusion to Cabello’s Lemma 3 is false. So what Cabello has really
done is to prove, by reductio ad absurdum, that there are cases where
∫
Λ
|P ′(λ) − P (λ)| dνψ is not negligible, even
though Pˆ ′ ≈ Pˆ . He has similarly proved that there are cases for which there is a non-negligible probability of two
nearly orthogonal projectors both evaluating to 1.
Of course, in a genuinely non-contextual theory, there would be a high probability of Pˆ ′ having the same value
as Pˆ , if Pˆ ′ − Pˆ is sufficiently small. The fact that the MKC models do not have this property means that they are
not non-contextual—as we showed in Section III. However, Cabello’s argument is not directed at MKC’s claim, that
their models are non-contextual. It is directed, instead, at MKC’s claim, that their models reproduce the empirical
predictions of quantum mechanics. There is no evident contradiction between this latter claim and the fact that the
valuations in their models are highly discontinuous.
It should, however, be stressed that, although it has not been proved that there does not exist a complete theory
of MKC type which is empirically equivalent to quantum mechanics, the contrary proposition has not been proved
either. The question, in short, remains open. Furthermore, although Cabello fails to establish his main contention,
some of his intermediate results are of considerable interest. It is possible that further investigation along these lines
would show that Cabello’s contention is, after all, correct. However, it appears to us that such a programme is unlikely
to succeed unless it is directed at one of the points of weakness indicated above, rather than at Clifton and Kent’s
statistical theorem (which seems to have been rigorously proved).
IX. CONCLUSION
A substantial part of this paper has been devoted to a criticism of MKC. We ought to stress, by way of conclusion,
that we actually consider that they have made a very important contribution to this subject. We have argued that
MKC’s claim, that their models “nullify” the KS theorem, was premature; in fact, fallacious. However, the models
themselves are deeply interesting. They confirm the fact that there are depths to the KS theorem which, in the past,
have not been sufficiently appreciated (“confirm” because this point had, in fact, already been established by the
constructions of Pitowsky [9]).
MKC take it to be almost self-evident that the existence of dense KS-colourable subsets of S2 “nullifies” the KS
theorem. We have argued that they are mistaken, and that there is actually no nullification. However, the mistake is
far from obvious. MKC’s contention seems, at first sight, highly plausible. At least, it seemed highly plausible to the
present author, before he began to seriously engage with the problem.
In order to see that the MKC models do not “nullify” the KS theorem it is necessary to appreciate the point made
in Section III, that a process does not count as a classical measurement unless it reveals, not simply a pre-existing
value, but a pre-existing piece of classical information. To put it another way, the outcome of a classical measurement
is, not simply a bare number, but a determinate proposition, which expresses some pre-existing classical fact. It is also
necessary to appreciate the points made in Section II and Appendix A, regarding non-ideal quantum measurements.
In previous accounts these points have not been explicitly recognized. They are, however, crucial, as the MKC models
demonstrate.
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Although the MKC models do not “nullify” the KS theorem, they do cast important new light on the physical
implications of the KS theorem. They show that there are subtleties to the physical interpretation of the KS theorem
which have not, in the past, been sufficiently emphasized. For this reason the work of MKC is valuable.
Although we have presented our discussion in the form of a criticism it might, in some ways, be more appropriate if
it was seen, in terms which are less prejudicial, as one more contribution to a line of investigation which Pitowsky [9]
initiated, and which MKC have continued. It is a line of investigation which might be worth pursuing further.
Pitowsky’s constructions are particularly interesting in this respect, because he challenges traditional assumptions
at a much more fundamental level. For instance, he challenges the assumption that sets which are not Lebesgue-
measurable have no physical significance. Pitowsky’s idea, that “one can, as it were, reduce physical paradox to a
mathematical ‘pathology’ ”, is unlikely to lead to a classical explanation of quantum phenomena (a “pathological”
theory—which is to say, a theory that seems strange as judged by the standards of ordinary intuition—is a non-
classical theory, almost by definition). However, that does not seem to be Pitowsky’s intention. Rather, he seeks to
gain additional insight, into what quantum mechanics is actually telling us, by considering the problem from a new
and unusual perspective. It is a deeply interesting idea, which deserves to be more widely known.
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APPENDIX A: APPROXIMATE VON NEUMAMNN MEASUREMENTS
In Section II we criticized MKC’s concept, of the single observable that is actually measured, for the special case of
the Stern-Gerlach apparatus. The purpose of this Appendix is to show that our argument generalizes, to the case of
any approximate von Neumann measurement (i.e. any measurement described by a unitary operator which is close
to the unitary operator describing a von Neumann measurement).
Consider, to begin with, a strict von Neumann measurement of the observable Aˆ =
∑
a∈E a|a〉〈a| (where E is the
set of eigenvalues) acting on an n dimensional Hilbert space H. For the sake of simplicity we assume that Aˆ is non-
degenerate. In order to perform the measurement Aˆ is coupled to a pointer observable µˆ =
∑
a∈E a |a〉ptpt〈a| acting
on a different n-dimensional Hilbert space Hpt (the state space of the measuring instrument). The measurement
interaction causes the evolution
Uˆ |a〉 ⊗ |φ0〉pt = |a〉 ⊗ |a〉pt (A1)
for all a, where Uˆ is the unitary evolution operator describing the measurement interaction, and |φ0〉pt is the (fixed)
initial state of the measuring instrument.
The measurement described by Eq. (A1) is ideal because [43]
1. It discriminates eigenstates with perfect reliability (if the system is initially in the eigenstate |a〉, then the final
pointer reading will certainly be a).
2. The final state correlations are perfect (if the final pointer reading is found to be a, then the final state of the
system is |a〉).
In practice it would be difficult, if not impossible to construct an apparatus such that Uˆ satisfied Eq. (A1) precisely.
A more realistic model of the kind of measurement which it might actually be possible to perform, in the laboratory,
would be
Uˆ |a〉 ⊗ |φ0〉pt = |a〉 ⊗ |a〉pt +
∑
b,c∈E
ǫa,bc |b〉 ⊗ |c〉pt (A2)
where the coefficients ǫa,bc are small.
Of course, the model measurement process described by Eq. (A2), though more realistic than the one described by
Eq. (A1), is still highly idealized. A real laboratory instrument is a complex macroscopic system having many other
degrees of freedom apart from the pointer observable. It is also an open system, undergoing non-negligible interactions
14
with its environment (these interactions play an important role in accounting for the fact that system+instrument
are in a mixed state at the end of the measurement process [44]). Lastly, it should be noted that in a real laboratory
measurement the final state correlations are often (though not always) very poor (for instance, in the traditional
Stern-Gerlach arrangement, where the particle hits a photographic plate, the result of the measurement does not
contain useful information regarding the final spin state of the particle). However, the model is sufficiently realistic
for present purposes.
The unitary operator Uˆ in Eq. (A2) is close to the unitary operator describing a von Neumann measurement. In
other words, it describes an approximate von Neumann measurement. The process is not an ideal measurement of
Aˆ. It is, however, a non-ideal measurement (which is the most that can reasonably be demanded of a real laboratory
procedure). Specifically:
1′. It discriminates eigenstates with a high degree of reliability (if the system is initially in the eigenstate |a〉, then
there is a high probability that the final pointer reading will approximately be a).
2′. The final state correlations are good (if the final pointer reading is found to be a then Tr
(
(Aˆ− a)2ρˆ) ≈ 0, where
ρˆ is the reduced density matrix describing the final state of the system, after the pointer has been read).
These properties should be compared with the defining characteristics of an ideal measurement (items 1 and 2 above).
We now show that the process also effects a non-ideal measurement of every other observable which is sufficiently
close to Aˆ.
Choose some continuous parameterization for the ONBs (orthonormal bases) in H, so that |a, ν〉 is the ONB with
parameter value ν. Let ν0 be parameter value corresponding to the original ONB: |a, ν0〉 = |a〉. Then an arbitrary
observable Bˆ can be expressed in the form
Bˆ = Aˆ(ν, δ) =
∑
a∈E
(a+ δa)|a, ν〉〈a, ν| (A3)
for suitable ν, δ. If Bˆ is close to Aˆ then we can choose ν ≈ ν0 and δ ≈ 0.
Eq. (A2) can be re-written in terms of the ONB |a, ν〉:
Uˆ |a, ν〉 ⊗ |φ0〉pt = |a, ν〉 ⊗ |a〉pt +
∑
b,c∈E
ǫa,bc(ν) |b, ν〉 ⊗ |c〉pt (A4)
where the coefficients ǫa,bc(ν) vary continuously with ν. It follows that, if ν ≈ ν0 and δ ≈ 0, then the coefficients
ǫa,bc(ν) will be small, and so the process will be a non-ideal measurement of Aˆ(ν, δ) (in the sense of the definition
expressed by items 1′ and 2′ above).
We conclude that Uˆ describes a non-ideal measurement of Bˆ for every Bˆ close to Aˆ—as claimed.
MKC assume that, given any non-ideal measurement of Aˆ, there will be a neighbouring observable Bˆ which is mea-
sured ideally, and which they take to be the only observable that is “actually” measured. We noted in Section II that
there exists at least one class of non-ideal measurements for which this assumption is invalid: namely, Stern-Gerlach
measurements. A Stern-Gerlach measurement is not an ideal measurement of anything: not an ideal measurement of
the nominal observable, which the experimeter records as having been measured, and not an ideal measurement of
any other observable either [31]. Measurements of this kind might be described as completely non-ideal. It is easily
seen that they are, in a certain well-defined sense, typical, or generic.
If the measurement described by Eq. (A2) is of the special kind assumed by MKC then
Uˆ |a, ν〉 ⊗ |φ0〉pt = eiθa |a, ν〉 ⊗ |a〉pt (A5)
for some ν ≈ ν0 and vector θ. We may thus identify the set of all such measurements with a neighbourhood of the
identity in the group U(n), having dimension n2. On the other hand, the space of coefficients ǫa,bc may be identified
with a neighbourhood in the coset space U(n2)/U(n2 − n), having dimension n2(2n − 1). It follows that, if n > 1,
the set of measurements assumed by MKC constitute a proper, lower-dimensional submanifold of the manifold of
all non-ideal measurements. This means that, if one were to select a set of coefficients ǫa,bc satisfying the unitarity
condition at random, then, for many reasonable choices of probability measure, there would be probability zero that
the measurement which resulted was of the special kind assumed by MKC. In any case, the contrary hypothesis,
that a randomly chosen laboratory measurement is likely to be of the kind assumed by MKC, cannot be considered
plausible.
Suppose, however, that a laboratory measurement of Aˆ did happen to be of the very special kind assumed by MKC.
Then there would be some observable Bˆ ≈ Aˆ which was measured ideally. However, MKC would still not be justified
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in arguing that Bˆ is the only observable that is “actually” measured. The fact that the measurement of Bˆ is slightly
better than the measurement of Aˆ does not imply that Aˆ is not measured at all. A measurement does not have to be
strictly ideal in order to count as a measurement (otherwise one would have to say that a Stern-Gerlach apparatus
does not measure spin, and that real photon detectors do not detect photons).
APPENDIX B: LEMMAS CONCERNING THE REGIONS C AND D.
The purpose of this appendix is to prove those results to which we appealed, without proof, in Section III. For
ease of reference we state the results as lemmas. The reader should refer to Section III for definitions of notation and
terminology.
Lemma 1 The continuity region C is KS-colourable. Furthermore f extends by continuity to a uniquely
defined continuous KS-colouring f¯ :C → {0, 1} .
Let C0 (respectively C1) consist of those vectors n ∈ C having a neighbourhood U such that f(n′) = 0 (respectively
f(n′) = 1) for all n′ ∈ U ∩ S20 .
C0 and C1 partition C into two disjoint (open) subsets. We may therefore define a function f¯ :C → {0, 1} by setting
f¯(n) = 0 if n ∈ C0, and f˜(n) = 1 if n ∈ C1.
Now let {e1, e2, e3} be any orthonormal triad ⊆ C. By construction, there exists a triad {e′1, e′2, e′3} ⊆ C ∩ S20
such that f¯(er) = f(e
′
r) for r = 1, 2, 3. It follows that {e1, e2, e3} must f¯ -evaluate to one of the “legal” combinations
011, 101, 110. A similar argument shows that two orthogonal vectors ∈ C cannot both f¯ -evaluate to 0, even if their
vector product /∈ C.
It follows that f¯ is a KS-colouring of the set C. The claim is now immediate.
Lemma 2 The discontinuity region D has non-empty interior.
Let {n1,n2, . . .nR} be any finite KS-uncolourable set. The fact that C (the complement of D) is KS-colourable
means that at least one of these vectors must ∈ D. Suppose that the labelling is such that, for some r ≥ 1,
{n1,n2, . . .nr} ⊆ D and {nr+1,nr+2, . . .nR} ⊆ C.
For each s = 1, . . . , r let ǫs be the angular distance from ns to C, and for each t = r + 1, . . . , R let δt be the
angular distance from nt to D. Define δ = min(r+1)≤t≤R
(
δt
)
. The fact that C is open means that δ > 0 (unless C is
empty—in which case the claim is immediate).
If it should happen that ǫs > 0 for some s, then ns is in the interior of D—which means that the interior of D
is non-empty. Otherwise we can find a suitable rotation, through an angle < δ, which will take one or more of the
vectors n1, . . . ,nr into C, while not taking any of the vectors nr+1, . . . ,nR out of C. After re-labelling this gives us
a new KS-uncolourable set {n′1,n′2, . . .n′R} with {n′1,n′2, . . .n′r′} ⊆ D and {n′r′+1,n′r′+2, . . .n′R} ⊆ C for some r′ < r.
If it should still happen that none of the vectors n′1, . . . ,n
′
r′ is in the interior of D we can repeat the procedure.
It is impossible to rotate all the vectors into C, so after sufficiently many iterations of the procedure at least one of
the vectors must be in the interior of D. It follows that the interior of D cannot be empty.
We conclude by noting that this argument actually establishes the more general statement, that the complement
of any open KS-colourable set must have non-empty interior.
Lemma 3 There is a fixed, model-independent, non-zero lower bound on the solid angle subtended by D
Let us note that it already follows from Lemma 2 that the solid angle subtended by D must be > 0, for any given
colouring. Lemma 3 implies a stronger statement: that one cannot, by choosing the colouring appropriately, make
the solid angle arbitrarily small.
We begin by establishing some notation. Let µ be the invariant measure on S2, normalized so that µ(S2) = 1 (i.e.
the solid angle scaled by 1/(4π)). Let O (respectively B) be the set of all open (respectively Borel, or µ-measurable)
subsets of S2 which are KS-colourable. Define
dO = 1− sup
U∈O
(
µ(U)
)
(B1)
dB = 1− sup
B∈B
(
µ(B)
)
(B2)
Clearly, dO ≥ dB (it is a non-trivial question as to whether dO actually = dB).
We will show that dB > 0. In view of the fact that C ∈ O and D = S2 − C this implies
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µ(D) ≥ dO ≥ dB > 0 (B3)
which establishes the claim.
Before proceeding to the proof, let us note that it follows from the last paragraph in the proof of Lemma 2 that
µ(U) > 0 for all U ∈ O. The proof which follows is needed to show that there is not a sequence of sets Un ∈ O such
that µ(Un)→ 0. This may appear intuitively obvious. However, the fact that there exist dense KS-colourable subsets
of S2 was intuitively surprising (at least to the present writer), and so it behoves us to be careful.
We now proceed to the proof that dB > 0.
Choose some fixed, finite, KS-uncolourable set {n1,n2, . . . ,n2M} ⊂ S2, with the property that nM+r = −nr for
r = 1, . . . ,M .
Let θ0 be the minimum angular separation of the vectors belonging to this set:
θ0 = min
1≤r,s≤M
(
cos−1(nr · ns)
)
(B4)
Surround each vector nr with a circular patch Er of radius θ0/2:
Er = {m ∈ S2: cos−1(m · nr) ≤ θ0/2} (B5)
Let B be any set ∈ B, and let Bc = S2 − B be its complement. We may assume, without loss of generality,
that B is invariant under the parity operation (implying that Bc is also invariant). By construction, the sets Er are
non-intersecting, with the possible exception of a set of measure zero on their boundaries. Consequently
µ(Bc) ≥
2M∑
r=1
µ(Er ∩Bc) (B6)
We next define, for each r, a function gr:S
2 → Er by
gr(m) = e
(θ0/2)m·Lnr (B7)
where L1, L2, L3 are the generators of SO(3). Thus, gr(m) is the vector obtained by rotating nr through a (fixed)
angle θ0/2 about the (variable) axis m. It is easy to see that, as m ranges over the whole of S
2, the interior of Er is
covered twice, and the boundary once. Consequently
µ(Er ∩Bc) = 1
2
∫
B˜c
r
Jr(m) dµ (B8)
where Jr is the Jacobian of gr, and B˜
c
r = g
−1
r (Er ∩Bc). Define, for each m ∈ S2,
J(m) = min
1≤r≤2M
(
Jr(m)
)
(B9)
Eqs. (B6) and (B8) then imply
µ(Bc) ≥ 1
2
(∫
∪M
r=1B˜
c
r
J(m) dµ+
∫
∪2M
r=M+1
B˜c
r
J(m) dµ
)
(B10)
We now observe that, for each fixed m ∈ S2, the set {g1(m), g2(m), . . . , g2M (m)}, being obtained by rotating the
KS-uncolourable set {n1,n2, . . .n2M}, must itself be KS-uncolourable. On the other hand, B is KS-colourable. It
follows that, for each m ∈ S2, we must have gr(m) ∈ Bc and gM+r(m) ∈ Bc for some r ≤ M . Consequently
∪Mr=1B˜cr = ∪2Mr=M+1B˜cr = S2, and
µ(Bc) ≥
∫
J(m) dµ (B11)
Since the right-hand side of this inequality is independent of B we may deduce
sup
B∈B
(
µ(B)
) ≤ 1− ∫ J(m) dµ (B12)
To complete the proof we note that J(m) is a continuous, non-negative function having finitely many (in fact 2M)
zeros. It follows that
dB ≥
∫
J(m) dµ > 0 (B13)
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Concluding Remarks
It is natural to consider, in addition to the sets O and B defined above, the set C, consisting of all closed, KS-
colourable subsets of S2. Define dC = 1 − supK∈C
(
µ(K)
)
. Clearly, dC ≥ dB. It is a standard result (see, for
example, Halmos [45], Chap. 10) that, for each Borel set B, there exists a sequence of closed sets Kn ⊆ B such that
µ(B) = limn→∞
(
µ(Kn)
)
. It follows that we also have dC ≤ dB. Combining these inequalities we deduce
dO ≥ dC = dB (B14)
The numbers dO and dC = dB could be regarded as non-classicality indices (the larger they are, the more radically
quantum mechanics departs from classical assumptions). From this point of view it would be interesting to know
their actual values.
The evaluation of the integral on the right-hand side of Inequality (B13), though straightforward, would be somewhat
tedious. We will therefore content ourselves with noting that it follows from Eq. (B9) that∫
J(m) dµ <
∫
Jr(m) dµ = 2
∫
Er
dµ = 2 sin2
(
θ0
4
)
(B15)
where r is any integer in the range 1, . . . , 2M , and where θ0 is the minimum angular separation of the vectors in the
KS-uncolourable set considered. In the case of the Conway-Kochen set [5,6] one has θ0 = 18.4
o (the angle between
the vectors (0, 1, 2) and (0, 2, 2)), implying that the right-hand side of Inequality (B13) is < 0.013.
One would like to know if dO is of the same order as the lower bound set by Inequality (B13)—implying that & 99%
of the area of S2 can be covered with an open KS-colourable subset—or whether the actual value is significantly larger.
This is a question which it might be interesting to investigate further. It might also be interesting to investigate the
analogous quantities defined on Hilbert spaces of dimension > 3. In particular, it might be interesting to investigate
the way in which these quantities vary with the dimension of the Hilbert space.
APPENDIX C: THE “OPERATIONAL” APPROACH OF SIMON ET AL AND LARSSON
Simon et al [17,19] and Larsson [18] (SBZL) claim to have proved an operational generalization of the KS theorem,
applying to real experiments (Larsson, however, does not use the word “operational”). Their result inspired the
generalized KS theorem proved in Section V of this paper. It also inspired part of the argument in Section VII.
However, although we are very significantly indebted to SBZL, we also have some significant criticisms. We will
argue, in fact, that their operational version of the theorem is invalid.
In the following we begin by criticizing SBZL’s operational definition of contextuality. We go on to identify a
loophole in SBZL’s argument. We conclude by exhibiting a model which gets through the loophole, and which
provides a concrete counter-example to their operational version of the generalized KS theorem.
SBZL consider an instrument which performs measurements of each of the N triads contained in some fixed KS
uncolourable set. The triad to be measured is determined by three switches. They assume that the system+instrument
combination is fully specified by: (1) the three switch positions e1, e2, e3, (2) the system hidden variables λS, (3) the
instrument hidden variables λI (Larsson, however, denotes the pair (λS, λI) by the single symbol λ). In general, the
rth pointer reading is given by a function Xr(e1, e2, e3, λS, λI) which depends on all three switch positions, as well as
the hidden variables. SBZL take it that a theory is non-contextual in an operational sense if and only if there exists,
for each measuring instrument, a single function X such that
Xr(e1, e2, e3, λS, λI) = X(er, λS, λI) (C1)
for r = 1, 2, 3.
This definition has the following features: (1) if the instrument is different then the function X may be different
and (2) X depends on the instrument hidden variables λI, as well as the system hidden variables λS. For these reasons
it is not a definition of non-contextuality in the ordinary sense.
A non-contextual theory (in the ordinary sense) is a theory in which measurements reveal the pre-existing values of
the observables measured. It is, in other words, a classical theory, at least so far as the concept of measurement is con-
cerned. Non-contextuality in SBZL’s operational sense, by contrast, does not have the implication that measurements
reveal pre-existing values (of the observables measured). It is not a signature of classicality. In fact, we will show
that it is not even inconsistent with the empirical predictions of quantum mechanics. It is therefore inappropriate. At
least, it is inappropriate if the aim is to identify hypotheses which the empirically verifiable predictions of quantum
mechanics exclude.
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Before proceeding further it will be convenient to digress, and consider the ordinary concept of non-contextuality
in a little more detail.
The context of a measurement is the particular procedure used to carry out the measurement. Alternatively, it
is what Bohr [40] describes as the “whole experimental arrangement”, and what Bell [2] describes as the “complete
disposition of the apparatus”. The term “contextuality” or “context-dependence” refers to the phenomenon in which
different procedures for measuring the same observable have different outcomes, even though the hidden state of the
system is initially the same.
A theory in which measurements reveal pre-existing values (of the observables measured) is obviously guaranteed
to be non-contextual. The converse is also true: if a theory is non-contextual, then measurements reveal pre-existing
values (of the observables measured). It may perhaps happen that pre-existing values are not explicitly mentioned, in
the formal description of a non-contextual theory. Nevertheless, they must be present implicitly (since, if the theory
predicts that a measurement of Aˆ will always produce the value a, then that effectively means the theory assigns to
Aˆ the value a). To say that a theory is non-contextual is logically equivalent to saying that it is a theory in which
measurements reveal pre-existing values (of the observables measured).
There is a tendency, in formal discussions, to focus on one particular kind of contextuality: namely, the kind where
the result of measuring Aˆ depends on which other commuting observables Bˆ, Cˆ, . . . are jointly measured along with
Aˆ. It is an important kind of contextuality because it lends itself to the proof of general theorems. However, there
are many other kinds.
A difference in measurement context is any difference in the detailed specification of the apparatus used for per-
forming the measurement. It need not be a major difference. Suppose, for example, that the shape of the pole pieces
in a Stern-Gerlach arrangement was slightly changed. This would count as a change of context. A real laboratory
instrument admits numerous minor variations on the basic design. A theory is not genuinely non-contextual unless
measurement outcomes are insensitive to every such variation.
In Eq. (C1) the function X depends on the instrument, and on λI. It follows that SBZL’s operational criterion
does not imply that measurement outcomes are genuinely independent of context. SBZL tend to focus on the switch
positions and pointer readings as the features of the measuring apparatus of which the experimenter has knowledge
(“the switch position is all he knows about”, as it is expressed in ref. [17]). However a real measuring apparatus has
many other controllable parameters: for example, the number of turns in each coil, the exact position of each screw,
the pressure in each evacuated chamber, etc. etc. A small change in one of these parameters will be reflected by a
change in the probability distribution on the variables λI, if not by a change in the function X itself. Consequently,
it may have a large affect on the measurement outcome, even in a theory satisfying SBZL’s operational criterion.
SBZL’s operational criterion is, in one way, too weak. Not only does their criterion fail to exclude models which are
highly non-classical. It is not even inconsistent with the empirical predictions of quantum mechanics (see the example
at the end of this appendix).
Their criterion is, in another way, too strong. We stated earlier that a non-contextual theory is one in which mea-
surements reveal pre-existing values (of the observables measured). However, this only applies to ideal measurements.
Non-ideal measurements do not certainly reveal exact pre-existing values, and so they may only be approximately
independent of context. SBZL’s criterion is meant to apply to real laboratory measurements. It is therefore unduly
restrictive in requiring that, for given λS, λI, measurements of e1 in the contexts {e1, e2, e3} and {e1, e′2, e′3} must,
with certainty, have the same outcome (this point is closely related to the point we made at the end of Section V,
when we argued that the condition Nǫq < 1 is not sufficient to ensure a contradiction with classical assumptions).
In short, the criterion for a theory to be genuinely non-contextual is, not Eq. (C1), but
Xr(e1, e2, e3, λS, λI) = f(er, λS) (C2)
for all λS, λI in a set of probability measure ≈ 1, and for some function f which (unlike X and Xr) is the same for all
measuring instruments. It will be seen that this is, in effect, the criterion we used in Section V.
Let us now consider SBZL’s argument.
SBZL consider a set of N switch settings (e11, e
1
2, e
1
3), . . . , (e
N
1 , e
N
2 , e
N
3 ) which cannot consistently be coloured. For
each r, let Ar be the set of hidden variables (λS , λI) such that
X(er1, λS , λI) +X(e
r
2, λS , λI) +X(e
r
3, λS , λI) 6= 2 (C3)
where X is the function defined by Eq. (C1) above.
Let ΛS and ΛI be the hidden state spaces of system and instrument respectively, and let µ be the probability
measure on ΛS × ΛI describing the system+instrument combination. SBZL make the crucial assumption, that µ is
the same for all switch settings.
It follows from the definitions that µ(Ar) ≤ ǫq for all r (where ǫq is the quantity which SBZL denote ǫ, and which
is defined by Eq. (1) of this paper). In view of the fact that ∪Nr=1Ar = ΛS × ΛI this implies
19
1 = µ
(
N⋃
r=1
Ar
)
≤
N∑
r=1
µ(Ar) ≤ Nǫq (C4)
SBZL conclude that theories which are non-contextual in their operational sense cannot reproduce the quantum
mechanical predictions for an apparatus with ǫq < 1/N .
The problem with this argument is the fact that it rests on the assumption that µ is the same for all switch
settings. The assumption is not justified. Changing the switch settings changes the quantum state of the instrument.
In a hidden variables theory the quantum state of the instrument is represented by a probability measure on Σ× ΛI
(where Σ is the space of switch settings). It is reasonable to assume that this probability measure will be of the form
δ × ν, where δ is a δ-function measure on Σ. However, there is no reason to assume that ν is the same for all switch
settings—which is what would be needed if SBZL’s assumption was to be justified.
To find an example of a hidden variables theory to which SBZL’s assumption is inapplicable, one does not need to
look further than the Bohm theory. In the Bohm theory the probability distribution is given by the square of the
modulus of the wave function, in the x-space representation. Changing the switch settings changes the wave function,
and so it will, in general, change the probability distribution.
It is not simply that SBZL’s argument is not sufficient to establish their conclusion. Their conclusion is not true—as
we now show, by means of a counter-example. The example we choose is a model of MKC type. It has the property
ǫq = 0. The model is not non-contextual in the ordinary sense, defined by Eq. (C2). However, it is non-contextual in
SBZL’s operational sense, defined by Eq. (C1).
Let S2 be the unit 2-sphere, and let S20 be the dense, KS-colourable subset on which the MKC valuations are
defined. For each λS, let fλS :S
2
0 → {0, 1} be the associated valuation.
If the hidden state of the instrument is λI the measurement reveals the pre-existing values of a triad τI(λI) =
{eI1(λI), eI2(λI), eI3(λI)} ⊆ S20 . The probability measure on ΛI is such that τI(λI) is always extremely close to the
triad of switch settings (this means that the probability measure must be strongly dependent on the switch settings—
contrary to what is assumed by SBZL).
Given any vector n ∈ S2 let s(n, λI) be the index s for which the scalar product eIs(λI) ·n is maximal (ambiguities
being resolved by taking the smallest such index). Then the rth pointer reading is given by
Xr(e1, e2, e3, λS, λI) = fλS
(
eIs(er ,λI)(λI)
)
(C5)
Comparing this equation with Eq. (C1) it can be seen that the model is non-contextual in SBZL’s operational sense
(with X(n, λS, λI) = fλS
(
eIs(n,λI)(λI)
)
). On the other hand the fact that fλS is a KS-colouring implies ǫq = 0.
The example thus shows that SBZL’s operational version of the generalized KS theorem is invalid.
Of course, the model is non-contextual in the ordinary sense, as defined by Eq. (C2). Consequently, there is no
contradiction with the result proved in Section V: that theories which are non-contextual in the ordinary sense cannot
reproduce the quantum mechanical predictions for an apparatus with ǫq ≪ 1/N .
The model actually shows that non-contextuality in SBZL’s operational sense is not inconsistent with the empirical
predictions of quantum mechanics, even as regards the outcome of measurements for which ǫq = 0. Consequently, it
also provides some additional grounds for considering their operational criterion to be inappropriate.
APPENDIX D: CONTEXTUALITY OF SEQUENTIAL ANALYZERS
The purpose of this appendix is to prove Inequality (10), establishing that the observable whose value is revealed
by a near-ideal analyzer must depend on context.
Let fλ be the KS-colouring of S
2
0 defined by the hidden state λ. Define an induced valuation f˜λ of the full unit
2-sphere S2 by
f˜λ(n) =
{
0 if µn({n′ ∈ S20 : fλ(n′) = 1}) < 0.5
1 if µn({n′ ∈ S20 : fλ(n′) = 1}) ≥ 0.5 (D1)
for all n. The significance of this construction is that, if the hidden state is λ, then there is probability ≥ 0.5 that a
measurement of n will have outcome f˜λ(n).
We now make the assumption, that the behaviour of the analyzers is independent of context.
Let τ be any orthonormal triad which f˜λ-evaluates to one of the “illegal” combinations 000, 011, 101, 110, 111. We
will show that, if τ is measured in the hidden state λ, there is probability ≥ 0.5 that the result will be “illegal”.
In fact, suppose that the f˜λ-values of τ are 000. Let pr be the probability that the result of measuring er is 0. The
defintion of f˜λ implies that pr ≥ 0.5 for each r. The assumption of context-independence implies that the probabilities
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are independent. Consequently, the probability that the measurement outcome will be one of the “legal” combinations
001, 010, 100 is
plegal = p1p2(1− p3) + p1p3(1− p2) + p2p3(1− p1) (D2)
It is straightforward to verify that the expression on the right hand side is always ≤ 0.5. A similar argument shows
that plegal is also ≤ 0.5 if the f˜λ-values of τ are one of the other four “illegal” combinations. We conclude that, in
every case, there is probability ≥ 0.5 that the measurement outcome will be “illegal”—as claimed.
Now let τ1, . . . , τN be a set of triads which cannot consistently be coloured. For each λ choose an index rλ such that
the f˜λ-values of τrλ are “illegal”. Let Λ be the set of all hidden states λ. For each index r define Λr = {λ ∈ Λ: rλ = r}.
On the one hand, it follows from the result proved in the last paragraph that, if λ ∈ Λr, then there is probability ≥ 0.5
that a measurement of τr will have an “illegal” outcome. On the other hand the sets Λ1, . . . ,ΛN partition Λ into N
disjoint subsets, so there must be an index r0 such that there is probability ≥ 1/N that λ ∈ Λr0 . Combining these
statements we deduce that there is probability ≥ 1/(2N) that a measurement of τr0 will have an “illegal” outcome.
However, it follows from the definition that this probability must be ≤ ǫq.
We deduce that, if the behaviour of the analyzers is context-independent, then Nǫq ≥ 1/2.
APPENDIX E: SEQUENTIAL MEASUREMENTS ARE JOINT MEASUREMENTS
Kent [38] has argued that a sequential measurement, such as the one illustrated in Fig. 2, is not a joint measurement.
According to him a process does not count as a joint measurement unless the different observables are measured all
together, in parallel so to speak. The purpose of this appendix is to explain why we consider this position to be
unjustified.
Measuring instruments are defined functionally, in terms of what they do. This is true both classically and quantum
mechanically. If a system performs the function, of an instrument which measures Aˆ, then it is an instrument which
measures Aˆ.
The function of a classical measuring instrument is to reveal pre-existing values. Suppose that one has a sealed box
with a dial and two terminals on the front, and suppose that one wishes to confirm that it is a classical ammeter. This
question can be decided without looking inside the box. It is sufficient to test the instrument with known currents,
and check that it reads correctly. Anything which does the job of a classical ammeter, is a classical ammeter.
A micrometer screw guage and an interferometer look very different. However, they both count as length measuring
instruments. This is because they both do the job of a length measuring instrument.
Similar considerations apply in quantum mechanics. The function of a quantum measuring instrument is to dis-
criminate eigenstates. Suppose one has a sealed box, with a hole into which spin 1 particles can be injected, and a
digital readout. Suppose it is found, after testing, that the box correctly identifies the joint eigenstates of (e1 · Sˆ)2,
(e2 · Sˆ)2, (e3 · Sˆ)2. Then that is enough to establish that it jointly measures these observables.
Anything which discriminates the joint eigenstates of (e1 · Sˆ)2, (e2 · Sˆ)2, (e3 · Sˆ)2, jointly measures these observables.
In particular, the apparatus illustrated in Fig. 2 jointly measures them.
A quantum measurement can always be conceived in “black-box” terms. In order to decide whether a process
is a quantum measurement of a given set of commuting observables it is only necessary to consider the state of
system+apparatus at the time when the measurement interaction commences and again, at the time when the
interaction is concluded (the difference between these times necessarily being > 0). If the initial and final states
are related in the required manner, then the process is a measurement of the observables concerned. Questions as to
the detailed behaviour of the state between these times, during the course of the interaction, are irrelevant.
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